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Abstract 
A Citizen’s Income, or a Basic Income, is not a new idea but it has been receiving 
increasing attention. There is confusion about the idea and an attempt is made to 
distinguish different concepts. Then a full Citizen’s Income is examined in relation to 
four key criteria: the justice of an unconditional benefit; the possibility and fairness of 
a simple individual benefit; economic efficiency; and political feasibility. On all four 
criteria, Citizen’s Income fails. It is concluded that Citizen’s Income is a wasteful 
distraction from more practical methods of tackling poverty and inequality and 
ensuring all have a right to an adequate income. 
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Introduction 
Citizen’s Income in essence could hardly be simpler: every individual citizen should 
receive an income from the state which goes to all without any conditions, is not 
related to contributions, not withdrawn as earnings change, not means-tested.  
 
Why is it attractive? The UN Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 stated that: 
“Everyone has a right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and his family.” (Article 25) 
A Citizen’s Income could ensure that right was achieved.  
 
The argument for a Citizen’s Income (CI for short) has been set out clearly and 
passionately by Torry (2013 and 2015). Basically it is argued that a CI is socially just, 
it would boost the economy, tackle poverty, integrate society and that it is feasible 
politically and practically.  
 
There is now active, enthusiastic and committed lobbying for a CI. At a global level 
there is a Basic Income Earth Network. In Britain there is a CI Trust - and similar 
organisations exist in many countries. The Royal Society of Arts, Compass and 
Progress have been supportive of the concept.  Writers such as Paul Mason and Guy 
Standing have been enthusiastic supporters. The Shadow Chancellor is reported to be 
considering the idea. The Guardian newspaper has headlined letters about CI 
‘Economic ideas which are good and true’ (14.12.15) and ‘Citizen’s income is an idea 
whose time has come’ (11.1.16). The idea is undoubtedly gaining prominence. 
 
This paper examines the case for a CI. It proceeds as follows. 
First, it attempts to clear some confusion that exists, distinguishing four distinct 
meanings attached to CI.  Then it examines the key ideas or structural elements 
underlying the case for a CI:   
 
The justice of unconditionality  
Individualized simplicity 
Economic efficiency  
Political feasibility  
 
Finally, some conclusions are drawn. 
 
Ground Clearing 
Citizen’s Income or CI is referred to in most countries as Basic Income (terms used 
here interchangeably). Other terms for essentially the same thing (which will not be 
used here) are Universal Basic Income, Basic Income Guarantee or BIG, Demogrant, 
and Social Dividend, and doubtless there are others. 
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CI is generally distinguished from existing social security systems in that it is not 
related to particular categories of people or particular conditions, it is not dependent 
on contributions and it is not withdrawn, taxed or means-tested. Its principal 
attractions, in contrast to the complexity of the current benefit and tax system, are its 
unconditionality and its simplicity. 
 
There is not, however, one common definition of CI. Despite CI being a simple idea, 
the term is used to describe several very different concepts. As a first step it may be 
useful to separate four concepts. 
 
A. Bonus CI 
In BC 483 a massive new seam of silver was found in the Athenian silver mine at 
Laurium. A statesman Aristides proposed that this be distributed among all citizens as 
a Citizen’s Dividend (which certainly would not have included slaves); but in that 
instance, as so often, the arms lobby prevailed and the financial bonus was used to 
expand the Athenian navy.  More recently, Alaska, not noted for its social 
progressivism, distributed royalties from oil extraction on state owned land as an 
equal annual payment of around US$1,000 to every citizen of Alaska who had been 
resident for at least a year. A few other examples of this type exist but in none of them 
is the Bonus CI sufficient to meet anyone’s needs. Such exogenous income is, 
however, rarely available and alternative uses have been found. In Norway, oil 
revenues have been invested in a sovereign wealth fund. In the UK, North Sea Oil 
taxation has been assimilated into general government revenue. This points to the fact 
that even where there is an exogenous source, there is still an issue on how it should 
be distributed. Some might argue that the least advantaged should be prioritised or that 
the funds be invested in education and health which might help the poorest far more 
than a uniform Bonus CI.  
 
Most nations do not enjoy exogenous sources of revenue so no bonuses are possible. 
Instead any CI has to be based on it being a redistributive mechanism paid for out of 
taxation, and that is what this paper focusses on. 
 
B. Partial CI 
Some have advocated a partial CI, namely a CI that goes only to some groups in 
society. In important respects that is what has existed for a long time in many 
countries.  
 
The Child Benefit in Britain was for nearly 40 years in effect a CI for children. When 
access was reduced in 2013 to families with an income over £50,000 it became 
means-tested although the means test, unlike most, applied to those better off.  In 
South Africa cash grants both to children and to older persons were introduced in the 
post-Apartheid era; again universality was restricted by a means test to exclude the 
better off. 
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Such benefits redistribute incomes to groups with extra needs or which are generally 
poor. They operate without the stigmatisation, non-take-up and administrative cost of 
means-tested benefits.  
 
While these universal benefits have much to commend them, to treat them as a form 
of CI or a step on the way to a full CI is very questionable. By being focused on 
particular groups they fail to meet the basic criterion for a genuine CI that it should be 
paid to every citizen. Further if a universal benefit, maybe labelled as a partial CI, is 
already paid to those groups in greatest need, there are diminishing returns in terms of 
reducing poverty from extending coverage to other groups in order to achieve a full 
CI.  
 
Universal, non-means-tested benefits have a distinguished history and in many 
societies can form an integral part of social security systems but it is more confusing 
than helpful to think of them as a partial CI or as a step towards a full CI. 
 
C. Supplemental CI 
One possible form of a full CI scheme is to introduce a modest CI alongside the 
existing social security system.  
 
Such a scheme has been put forward and simulated by Torry (2016). Essentially, 
personal tax allowances are ended and converted into tax credits, to be called a CI, 
which are enhanced out of a 3% increase in income tax rates and higher national 
insurance contributions on the higher paid. This proposal is not therefore financed by 
a simple proportional tax but it is substantially redistributive. The CIs affordable on 
this basis are not the same for all but are age-related:  
 
 Young Adult        £50 per week  
 Working age adult £60 per week 
 Citizen’s Pension £30 per week 
 
Most significantly, the social security system is maintained. What it would achieve, 
according to Torry, is a reduction in means-tested benefits and a reduction in 
inequality and child poverty.  Such a scheme would be akin to the proposals for a Tax 
Credit scheme put forward but never implemented by the Conservative Government in 
1973 plus more redistributive taxes on the better off. The tax credit proposals would 
have replaced personal tax allowances worth more the higher the marginal tax rate 
with a fixed value tax credit worth the same to all in the tax system (but not those 
outside the tax system). Torry wrote:  
“The impact of this quite conservative and easy to achieve Citizen 
Income scheme on both employment incentives and poverty would have 
been both positive and considerable.” (Torry, 2016 p 11).   
But since the social security system is maintained, it would not achieve any of the 
simplification that is often claimed for a CI. Indeed, by adding a new unconditional 
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benefit for all on top of the manifest complexities of the current social security system 
it seems certain to add to complexity.  
 
What are lacking in Torry’s modelling of a modest supplemental CI scheme are any 
serious alternatives. If the tax rates on the better off are substantially increased (by 
15% combining the tax and NI increases) then this would pay for improvements to 
social security and tax credits which could undoubtedly have far more impact on 
poverty than spending the extra revenue on a CI going to all citizens. 
 
As with a partial CI scheme, a supplemental CI scheme which leaves social security in 
place fails to achieve the central and crucial claim for a full CI scheme – namely that 
it can replace the social security system with a fairer, more effective system that is 
economically and politically feasible. An incremental CI is not a real CI – it would be 
another tier in an already very complex system of redistribution. 
 
D. A Full CI 
A full CI scheme would provide an unconditional income adequate to live on to all 
citizens that would not be means-tested or withdrawn. (It might, to make its status 
clear, be called a Full Member of Nation Trust Income or the Full MONTI, but this 
might be thought irreverent by some. 
 
A full CI is the ultimate objective of the Basic Income Earth Network and many 
advocates of CI. It is therefore appropriate to assess the full version. For if the Full CI 
is desirable then steps that would help get there are worthwhile. But if the objective is 
not desirable then there is no point in taking steps in that direction. 
 
The focus of the rest of this paper is, therefore, on a full CI financed out of taxation.  
The paper will consider four key criteria by which to judge a full CI: 
 
 The justice of unconditionality 
 Individualised simplicity 
 Economic efficiency 
 Political feasibility 
 
The justice of unconditionality 
Perhaps the strongest argument for an unconditional basic income, certainly the most 
widely cited, is that of Phillipe van Parijs, a Belgian philosopher, in his paper ‘Why 
Surfers Should Be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic Income’ (1991).  
 
Van Parijs puts forward a case on Rawlsian lines. In brief, Rawls’s Theory of Justice 
(1971) argued that all social primary goods – liberty and opportunity, income and 
wealth, and the social bases of self-respect – should be distributed equally unless an 
unequal distribution of any, or all, of these goods is to the advantage of the least 
favoured. If we do not know what position we would have in society – the “veil of 
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ignorance” – social and economic inequalities are only acceptable if they benefit the 
least advantaged - the difference principle. 
 
Using Rawls’s approach, Van Parijs reaches a powerful conclusion: 
“what I here take to be Rawls’s version of the real-libertarian position 
and in particular his Difference Principle appear to recommend – subject 
to the respect of fundamental liberties and of fair equality of opportunity 
– that one should introduce a wealth-distributing, power-conferring, 
self-respect-preserving unconditional basic income. Indeed, that one 
should introduce such an income at the highest sustainable level.” (Van 
Parijs, 1991, p105). 
 
The key question is whether Van Parijs’s conclusion that an unconditional CI is just, 
and that surfers should be fed unconditionally, stands up to scrutiny. Certainly Rawls 
himself disputed this conclusion in terms: 
“those who surf all day off Malibu must find a way to support 
themselves and would not be entitled to public funds.” (Rawls, 1988 
p257). 
It is therefore fundamental to examine Van Parijs’s case and his difference with 
Rawls.  
 
The root of the difference between Van Parijs and Rawls is the addition of leisure to 
the list of socioeconomic advantages governed by the Difference Principle that Rawls 
proposes. Van Parijs regards this as: 
“fundamentally flawed, because a liberally indefensible bias has crept 
into the interpretation of real freedom provided by the Difference 
Principle. (Van Parijs op.cit. p105). 
 
To explain why he thinks this, Van Parijs introduces two important characters: 
“To understand the nature of this bias, consider Crazy and Lazy, two 
identically talented but rather differently disposed characters. Crazy is 
keen to earn a high income and works a lot for that purpose. Lazy is far 
less excited by the prospect of a high income and has decided to take it 
easy. With the basic income at the highest feasible level…Crazy is 
rather miserable, because her net income falls far short of the income 
she would like to have. Lazy, however, is blissful.” (Van Parijs op.cit. 
p105). 
 
Van Parijs argues that Crazy’s preference for a high income is purely a personal 
preference which should be given no more significance than Lazy’s preference for 
leisure. Rawls, however, has suggested: 
“adding leisure to the list of socioeconomic advantages [primary goods] 
governed by the Difference Principle. More specifically, “twenty-four 
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hours less a standard working day might be included in the index of 
leisure. Those who are unwilling to work would have a standard 
working day of extra leisure, and this extra leisure would be stipulated 
as equivalent to the index of primary goods of the least advantaged.”” 
(Van Parijs op.cit. p108, citing Rawls ‘The Priority of Rights’, p257). 
 
Van Parijs argues that this line of argument has a “fatal defect”. 
“assume some exogenous change” comes about (say, the random 
discovery of another reserve of natural resources) which makes it 
possible to redistribute more to the least advantaged. What form should 
this redistribution take? Leaving incentive issues aside for the moment, 
the consistent implementation of Rawls’s proposal requires that the 
funds thus becoming available be used as a subsidy that is proportional 
to the number of hours worked.” (Van Parijs op.cit. p109-110). 
This would mean that Lazy, working zero hours, would get none of the subsidy, or 
Bonus CI in my terminology. 
 
Van Parijs continues: 
“For simplicity’s sake, just consider the extreme case. The primary 
goods index of those who do not work at all and have no income is set 
equal, as we have seen, to that of the least advantaged full-time workers. 
If we were to put Rawls’s proposal into practice, this index would go up 
as a result of the exogenous change. But, clearly, this improvement in 
the measured condition of this fraction of the least advantaged [meaning 
people like Lazy] is purely fictional. It hides a stagnation of their 
situation in absolute terms and a worsening of their relative position, and 
simply reflects the fact that their leisure is postulated to be equivalent, at 
any particular time, to the income enjoyed at the same time by the least 
advantaged full-time workers. Why should this sub-category of the least 
advantaged not claim a real share of the exogenously generated benefit, 
instead of being treated to a sheer semantic trick?...No such proposal 
could possibly be justified by a non-discriminatory concern with the real 
freedom of the least advantaged. (Van Parijs op.cit. p111). 
 
This is, according to Van Parijs: 
“an objection which is, in my view, decisive and challenges the very 
consistency of Rawls’s proposal with a liberal perspective. His proposal 
involves a liberally unjustifiable bias against some of those who are, 
using Rawls’s own standards, among the least advantaged.” (Van Parijs 
op.cit. p111). 
On this basis, Van Parijs argues that discrimination against Lazy is unjustified and 
therefore conditionality is unjustified. 
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Before considering the rest of Van Parijs’s argument, let us examine this crucial 
contention. Rawls never replied to Van Parijs’s paper but there seems absolutely no 
doubt  that Rawls would have thought that the least advantaged should benefit from an 
exogenous bonus – that is precisely what the difference principle requires. 
 
Rawls wished to put a value on leisure and it seems evident that if someone 
voluntarily chooses to forgo wages of $x (most surfers in Malibu are American) then 
this implies that the leisure is worth to him or her at least $x – something that is 
relevant in assessing their index of primary goods. Van Parijs interpreted Rawls’ 
statement about the value of leisure literally, but not sensibly, to imply that any 
allocation of a social benefit should be made proportionally to the hours worked. He 
justified this on the ground that this would ensure the primary goods index grew at the 
same pace for all (which presumed to know more about the index of primary goods 
than even Rawls himself appeared to know). Van Parijs’s assertion and what follows 
from it is an argument built on sand - sand, one could say, from Malibu beach.  
 
Van Parijs rightly pointed to the diversity of “work”. What he did not point to is the 
diversity of “leisure”. Not being at work can be many things – most crucially one can 
distinguish desired from undesired leisure. The former has value, the latter often does 
not. When Richard II, imprisoned and unaware that he was shortly to be murdered 
said, according to Shakespeare, “I wasted time and now doth time waste me”; this 
was, to put it more prosaically, unwanted leisure. A more common example is 
involuntary unemployment. The “leisure” of involuntary unemployment cannot be 
valued at the level of the earnings forgone, if only because no earnings are forgone. 
Because there undoubtedly is involuntary unemployment there is a strong justification 
for unemployment benefits, subject to fair and reasonable conditions. By contrast, 
those who choose to give up well paid jobs, whether temporarily or permanently, for 
the delights of the Malibu surf clearly value their leisure more highly than their 
forgone earnings. Rawls clearly assumed that leisure on Malibu beach was voluntary 
leisure and it follows that it has a value of at least the earnings forgone. 
 
The fatal error in Van Parijs’s argument was, then, his failure to distinguish between 
the reasons why people were not working and his lumping all leisure together as one 
homogeneous state. Unwanted leisure, due to unemployment, sickness or disability, or 
unwanted and enforced retirement, is not leisure in the same sense as leisure enjoyed 
by the Malibu surfer. Van Parijs’s whole justification for unconditionality collapses if 
one makes the distinction between voluntary and involuntary leisure. 
 
To return to Van Parijs’s paper, he discussed a basic income resulting from an 
exogenous change, the new natural resources, in effect the bonus CI discussed in the 
previous section. Van Parijs then goes on to consider three other possible sources of 
basic income: external resources, inherited technology and the nature of the labour 
market. 
 
First, he considers external resources, such as land which the self-driven Crazy needs 
to work on to generate income, and how they should be distributed and traded. Van 
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Parijs endorses Dworkin’s argument that there should be equality of external 
resources (Van Parijs op.cit pp112-117), although he does not follow up what this 
implies. Van Parijs is right to emphasise the importance of the distribution of land and 
other assets in determining the fortunes of Lazy and Crazy; yet he does not give 
further consideration to policy towards the inheritance of land or other assets, 
important though this is for long-term inequality. Van Parijs is also right to follow 
Dworkin (1981) in emphasising the importance of inequalities of external resources, 
including education, but again he does not pursue the implications of this for social 
policies. 
 
Second, he argues that inherited technology determines income levels: 
“From rudimentary cooking recipes to sophisticated industrial software, 
it is obvious enough that much of our material standard of living, much 
of our wealth, can be ascribed to our technology. If we could add the 
value of all inherited technology to the value of all inherited capital, 
would the amount available for financing the basic income not be 
greatly increased?” (Van Parijs op.cit. pp118-119). 
 
However, he argues that, because of the non-exclusive nature of technology, its 
opportunity cost is zero. Therefore: 
“the liberally justifiable level of the basic income gains nothing 
whatsoever from the inclusion of inherited technology in the common 
pool.” (Van Parijs op.cit. pp120-121). 
 
The third issue Van Parijs considers is the nature of the labour market. Much 
discussion of the labour market makes: 
“the “Walrasian” assumption that the labor market, like any other 
market, tends to clear, that in the absence of institutional constraints 
(such as a minimum wage), anyone who wants a job and is qualified for 
it will get one at the standard rate for a given type of skill.” (Van Parijs 
op.cit. p122). 
 
By contrast: 
“suppose now that we are in a non-Walrasian economy, that is, that for 
some reason, the labor market does not tend to clear. This may be 
because of obstacles to perfect competition, such as minimum wage 
legislation or union monopolies. But it may also be due to mechanisms 
that are consistent with perfect competition, such as those highlighted by 
the so-called insider-outsider and efficiency-wage theories of 
involuntary unemployment.” (Van Parijs op.cit. p123).  
 
If involuntary unemployment is high: 
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“room is made for a sizable increase in the level of basic income that is 
warranted on real-libertarian grounds. For it amounts to sharing among 
all the employment rents otherwise monopolized by those in 
employment. These rents are given by the difference between the 
income (and other advantages) the employed derive from their jobs, and 
the (lower) income they would need to get if the market were to clear.” 
(Van Parijs op.cit. p124). 
 
There are good grounds for sharing employment rents but there is no justice in sharing 
them among all those who have leisure. Those who should, in fairness, share them are 
those who are involuntarily unemployed, who have involuntary leisure. This is 
achieved by having unemployment benefits that are conditional on being unemployed 
and seeking employment. It may be noted that if all unemployment were voluntary 
then the labour market would indeed have cleared and fit Walras’s model, and Van 
Parijs’s non-Walrasian employment tax to pay for a basic income could not exist. 
 
In concluding, Van Parijs returned to the welfare hippies and Malibu surfers with 
which he started and wrote: 
“Thus it is just, contra John Rawls…that Malibu surfers be fed…feeding 
them does not go against the widely held view that it is “unfair for able-
bodied people to live off the labor of others.” For this is a serious 
misdescription of what Malibu surfers are doing if all they live off is 
their share, or less than their share, of rents which would otherwise be 
monopolized by those who hold a rich society’s productive jobs” (Van 
Parijs op.cit. pp130-131). 
Yet it is an argument that is fundamentally flawed. Van Parijs fails to establish a 
convincing case for an unconditional basic income. 
 
A rather different but equally convincing critique of Van Parijs’s argument has been 
put forward by Torisky (1993) who addresses ‘The Challenge of Crazy and Lazy’. He 
argues: 
“The crucial question posed…is whether the Malibu surfer may be 
counted as supporting the liberal political conception of justice…one 
might count as central a willingness to contribute in some significant 
social, political, or cultural way to the continued existence of just 
institutions in society – that is to live as a member and not as a stranger 
or parasite…Since membership has its benefits, why should society not 
require of those who benefit that they contribute in some significant 
way? It is one thing when a person, in circumstances beyond his or her 
control, is unable to contribute, either temporarily or permanently, to the 
society of which he or she is a member. But members of even a liberal 
society – rightfully, it seems - resent a fellow member not acting as a 
member ought to act, but instead as a free rider. (Torisky, 1993 pp294-
5). 
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Torisky’s argument is based on a belief that membership of society involves mutual 
obligations and that conditionality is therefore justified. His conclusion is that: 
“Van Parijs’s substantial unconditional basic income cannot rest on a 
Rawlsian conception of liberal neutrality, and Rawls’s political 
liberalism is not forced to accept an unconditional basic income as van 
Parijs argues.” (Torisky, 1993 p297). 
 
In terms of need and desert, a simple distinction was made by Arneson (1996) in his 
paper, ‘Should Surfers Be Fed?’ 
“Whether people are truly needy or not depends on their potential 
income (the income they could earn if they chose to seek it) not their 
actual income, but the basic income grant proposal varies its treatment 
of individuals according to their actual income.” (Arneson,1996, p38). 
 
If Lazy on the Malibu beach had chosen to forgo earnings that were at least adequate 
and probably affluent, since surfing is not cheap, then he has potential income and is 
not “truly needy”. The reason such a Malibu surfer does not warrant an unconditional 
benefit is, then, simply because he or she does not deserve it or need it.  
 
Whether for Arneson’s, Torisky’s or my reasons, there is nothing convincing nor just 
about Van Parijs’s argument for unconditionality. It is unfortunate that it has been 
accepted so uncritically by so many for so long. 
 
Individualised simplicity 
A full CI is intended to ensure that needs are met and do this in a simple manner with 
all enjoying an unconditional CI. But not everyone has the same needs. 
 
Sen criticised the primary goods approach of Rawls on the grounds that it  
“seems to take little note of the diversity of human beings…If people 
were basically very similar, then an index of primary goods might be 
quite a good way of judging advantage. But, in fact, people seem to have 
very different needs varying with health, longevity, climatic conditions, 
location, work conditions, temperament, and even body size” (Sen, 
1980, pp215-6) 
 
Some of the most important differences in needs relate to: 
 
A Disability 
In addition to basic needs for food, clothing and housing, many people with 
disabilities incur extra costs for heating or food. Many are unable to do paid work. 
Some require constant attendance night and day to look after them and many more 
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require attendance by day. All these impose extra costs. It is recognised, and is not in 
dispute, that these extra costs require special disability additions or benefits. 
 
B Housing 
Housing benefit now recognises that housing costs are not uniform and that in order to 
enable people on low incomes to live in high rent areas there needs to be a targeted, 
means-tested subsidy to assist with housing costs.  
 
C  Living arrangements 
There are economies of scale in cohabitation. Two people together can share housing 
costs, heating, furniture, much household equipment and meals, the preparation of 
which increases, but not proportionally, with the number to be fed. Thus there is a 
strong case for benefits to reflect the reality of household economics and not treat all 
individuals as discrete units. Further, the value of home production whether cooking, 
cleaning, raising children, bees or turnips is related to household composition and the 
time not spent in paid work.  
 
Basing CI on individuals and assuming they have identical needs is, for all these 
reasons, less than just. By contrast, the social security and in some ways the tax 
system attempt to take these factors into account, however inadequately. 
 
Many advocates of CI do recognise that people with disabilities and also perhaps with 
high housing costs require special treatment with some form of supplemental CI. Yet 
to do this involves complicating the simplicity of CI, undermining one of CI’s greatest 
superficial attractions. Introducing complexity may seem unfortunate, unless one is in 
one of the conditions for whom complexity is fairer than simplicity.  A masonic 
straight-edge is scarcely appropriate in dealing with the crooked timber of humanity. 
 
Economic Efficiency 
There are many economic issues raised by a CI. Here the emphasis is on how a full CI  
would affect the efficiency and equity of the economy. It is assumed that a CI would 
have to be financed by taxation and it is assumed for simplicity that this taxation 
would be a proportional tax on income. 
 
The impact of a CI can be represented in a simple and familiar diagram showing the 
relationship between original and final income, as shown in Figure 1. A negative 
income tax can be similarly represented, as shown in Figure 2. It will be seen that the 
result is identical to a CI, although the mechanisms differ. The key thing with both CI 
and NIT is that final income is determined by original income, not by any other 
personal characteristics or circumstances. 
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Figure 1: Citizen’s Income 
 
 
Figure 2: Negative Income Tax 
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Figure 3: Citizen’s Incomes 
 
 
Within such a system there can be a range of redistributions, as shown in Figure 3. 
With no redistribution, then as was just seen final income is the same as original 
income. With total redistribution, there is a 100% tax taking all of original income, 
and everyone’s final income is the CI. The latter is akin to post-revolutionary, pre-
reform China when the system described as the ‘Iron Rice Bowl’ prevailed in which 
virtually all consumption was collectively distributed.  Of course, as China found, a 
100% tax may promote equality but it removes all financial incentives and may result 
in a much lower level of output, and therefore may not be to the benefit of the least 
advantaged. This is a reminder that income, or command over resources, depends on 
output and that consumption depends on the resources available from production. 
There is little benefit from finding a seam of silver, or even gold, if one is alone on a 
desert island. 
 
The goal of an unconditional CI, as put forward by Van Parijs, was to provide for the 
needs of all. What level of income is required to achieve this is a matter of limitless 
debate, but the official poverty level in Britain is approximately half average income 
level. To pay for a CI that on average provided half the mean income per head would 
require a proportional tax on all income of about 50%. At present social security is 
about one-third of existing public expenditure, so if other government services were 
maintained the overall level of tax would be: 
 
  Two-thirds of current taxation plus 50%.  
 
This would be a huge increase of taxation and total government expenditure.  
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Why would a full CI which maintained existing levels of income for those now 
dependent on social security be so very expensive? 
 
It is important to remember that the social security system was conceived primarily as 
a means of tackling poverty or want. As the Beveridge Report stated: 
The Plan for Social Security…starts from the diagnosis of want…Of all 
the want shown by the surveys [pre-war social surveys], from three-
quarters to five-sixths…was due to interruption or loss of earning 
power. Practically the whole of the remaining one-quarter to one-sixth 
was due…to the size of the family. (Beveridge, 1942, Para 11). 
 
By targeting these causes of want or poverty directly through social insurance and 
family allowance (later child benefit), poverty was tackled directly and efficiently.   
 
Of course in the 70 years since the Beveridge Report the causes of poverty have 
changed; far more poverty is associated with lone-parents and working families. But it 
remains true that to tackle poverty it is far more efficient to direct resources at the 
causes of poverty than to distribute them to everyone. 
 
This was put clearly by Akerlof (1978) when he identified the trade-offs in the design 
of institutions to redistribute incomes: 
“Some types of programs, either by their eligibility requirements or by 
the self-selection of the beneficiaries, identify (tag) people who are in 
special need. With tagging, taxpayers (as opposed to beneficiaries) are 
denied the benefit of the transfer, so that in effect a lump sum transfer is 
made to tagged people. 
In contrast, with a negative income tax, a grant is made to all taxpayers and this 
grant must be recovered to achieve the same net revenue. This recovery results 
in high marginal tax rates, whose disincentive effects are a major disadvantage 
of a negative income tax. This disadvantage, however, must be weighed against 
the disadvantages of tagging, which are the perverse incentives to people to be 
identified as needy (to be tagged), the inequity of such a system, and its cost of 
administration.”  (Akerlof, 1988, p 17). 
 
To illustrate this, imagine a world in which: 
 
  All poor people were left-handed 
  All right-handed people were not poor 
  Most people were right handed 
 
It would be possible to eliminate poverty in one of two ways: 
 
 A  Provide everyone with a CI and raise the tax to pay for it 
 B  Provide a benefit conditional on being left-handed and raise much less tax.  
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Apart from the problem of testing left-/right-handedness and possible abuse, it is 
immediately evident that alternative B is more efficient. This may seem a very 
obvious point but it is fundamental to understanding why CI is so inefficient, wasteful 
and costly. Of course, poverty is not now so precisely associated with certain 
categories or conditions as in the example. But it is still predominantly related to 
certain conditions, which are, broadly, those which are targeted by the social security 
and tax credit systems. 
 
A full CI goes to everyone unconditionally, whereas social security is targeted at 
certain groups who in the absence of social security would be most likely to be poor. 
In consequence, a full CI that replaces social security is far more costly than social 
security, and this has to be paid for from higher taxes on all incomes with far-reaching 
economic consequences. The inevitable conclusion is, therefore, that a targeted social 
security system was, is, and will be more efficient and equitable than a full CI. 
 
If, as some favour, a full CI were introduced at a much lower level without raising tax 
rates, then the level of CI would be far below current social security levels and the 
result would be much more poverty. A simulation carried out over 30 years ago 
showed this very clearly - the proportion below the then Supplementary Benefit level 
would have tripled and inequality would have greatly increased (Piachaud, 1982).   
 
Thus far the focus has been on the distributional impact of a CI assuming people’s 
behaviour was not changed. But this assumption is clearly wrong.  
 
Labour market behaviour is affected by income and substitution effects, both likely to 
change as a result of a full CI. People who have interesting, attractive jobs may 
continue to work much as now. But most paid work is, to a greater or lesser extent, 
unattractive and people only do it because they are compensated by their wage. It is 
not clear, as some seem to imagine, that a CI would change the nature of most paid 
work, although the hours people decide to work could well change substantially. But 
estimating the possible labour market effects is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
It is not only hours worked and labour force participation decisions such as when to 
retire that could be affected by a full CI.  Life decisions relating to training and 
education, child bearing and child care and much more could also be affected. 
Research may shed some light on what the behavioural effects might be, but a full CI 
involves such fundamental changes that any predictions of their effects will remain 
highly speculative. 
 
Political Feasibility  
Is a full CI politically attractive and feasible? 
 
As described, the idea of a basic or CI is not remotely new, nor is the equivalent idea 
of a negative income tax. In the past, the main proponent of a negative income tax, 
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equivalent to a full CI, albeit at a low level, was Milton Friedman (1962), who also 
wanted to scrap social security and most social services. A more recent Right wing 
advocate is Charles Murray who saw a guaranteed income, equivalent to CI, as 
fundamental to “A Plan to Replace the Welfare State” (2006). He was clear about his 
perspective, which was broadly similar to that of Milton Friedman. Murray wrote: 
“The welfare state drains too much of the life from life. Specifically, it 
does so by stripping the institutions of family and community of many 
of their functions and responsibilities…The Guaranteed Income returns 
these functions and responsibilities to family and community. In this 
sense, the importance of the Guaranteed Income on human relationships 
and the vitality of communities is not that each adult has US $10,000 a 
year, but that government has withdrawn all the ways in which the 
apparatus of the welfare state tries to take the trouble out of people’s 
lives.” (Murray, 2006, p7). 
 
That social policies promote recognition and redistribution, opportunities and social 
justice are, for Murray, taking “life from life” – and are wrong. Not all share this view.  
 
Now many advocates of a CI are on the political Left. One notable and passionate 
advocate of a CI is Guy Standing. He has described a “precariat” trapped in insecure, 
badly paid, short-term jobs; he argues that work must be rescued from jobs and labour 
and condemns “pushing everybody into jobs” (Standing, 2011, p 145). He sees 
universality as: 
“the only principle that can arrest the spread of means testing, 
conditionality and paternalistic nudging. It is the only principle that can 
be used to retain political stability as the world adjusts to the 
globalisation crisis.” (Standing, 2011, p155). 
 
In the face of the increasing commodification of labour that he sees as inevitable, 
Standing wishes to ensure security through a CI: 
“The need for multi-layered ex-ante security…is thus a reason for 
wishing the good society of the future to include an unconditional basic 
income.” (Standing, 2011, p175). 
 
He sees the present global prospects as a “politics of the inferno” and argues that an 
unconditional basic income could turn this into a “politics of paradise”. 
 
Standing is not alone in having dark forebodings about the future of work, the spread 
of robots and the prospect of the loss of a large proportion of current jobs. But there is 
a real possibility that if more security is provided by the state for everyone, including 
all those in the labour market, then employers will provide even less security in work, 
leading as a result to more, not less, precariousness.   
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A world in which half of all jobs disappear, as some forecast, and those without jobs 
live on CI and depends on the taxation of those still in work and those who own the 
robots, is a world in which the workless seem doomed to be second-class citizens.  
 
The future distribution of employment is as important an economic and social issue as 
any on the horizon but an unequal distribution of work will not be prevented or 
satisfactorily alleviated by a CI. The distribution of employment has always mattered, 
and this will not change. As Beveridge recognised, full employment is fundamental to 
tackling poverty, and this is still true and will remain true. CI is a distraction from this 
goal and could quite possibly make it less attainable. 
 
If many on the political Left and Right favour a CI, why has it not been introduced 
long ago? Donald Hirsch, reviewing for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation whether a 
CI could work, argued that there were not just practical issues but fundamental issues 
which:  
“concern the kind of income redistribution system that the British public 
wishes to buy into. In particular, it would require us to consent to be 
taxed much more, to change the prevailing social attitude about the 
conditionality of support for working-age people outside work and to 
accept a much greater form of ‘rough justice’ in meeting certain basic 
needs such as housing. (Hirsch, 2015 p 25). 
 
A large part of the political problem with a CI is that would involve a huge increase in 
“churning” – money being given and received by the same people. Most of those 
receiving a CI would gain nothing from it since they would pay out as much or more 
in extra tax. It may be economically irrational that many people view tax allowances 
as fundamentally different from benefit expenditures, but it is a political reality. Even 
the modest proposal to turn tax allowances into tax credits proposed by the 
Conservative government in 1973 foundered; in part this was because they seemed 
more akin to government expenditure. 
 
Some would blame lack of imagination, lack of political courage, conservatism and 
inertia for the failure to promote such a bold advance. The more obvious explanation 
that has been indicated here is that: 
 
 Unconditional benefits are not perceived by most people to be fair. 
 Providing benefits based on individuals rather than social needs is unfair. 
 The cost of a full CI in terms of increased taxes is seen as unacceptable or a 
very poor way of spending extra taxes. 
 Priority should be given to social policies that improve education, health and 
 housing which are capital investments in people’s opportunities.  
 
There seems no reason why the politics of a CI will change substantially in the future. 
Thus, it seems extremely unlikely that any political party likely to gain majority 
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support will adopt an unconditional CI as a policy proposal either in the full or 
supplemental forms discussed here. 
 
Conclusion 
The idea of a CI has been examined here in relation to four key aspects: the justice of 
unconditionality, individualised simplicity, economic efficiency and political 
feasibility. These are pillars on which the idea of a CI has rested. It has been 
concluded that with respect to each of these pillars CI fails. With defects in all four 
pillars the whole edifice of a full CI cannot stand up. While a ‘bonus CI’ may be 
politically attractive in certain circumstances, a full CI paid for out of taxation as a 
replacement for an improved social security system does not stand up to scrutiny. 
 
Does this, then, mean that there should not be or will not be a right to an adequate 
standard of living? This does not follow, nor should it. This paper started by citing the 
UN Declaration of Human Rights on the right to an adequate standard of living. The 
UN Declaration also set out the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just 
and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment (Article 
23) and that everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security (Article 
22). Put together these rights can provide a framework for an adequate standard of 
living for all, and do so in a way that is fairer than a CI, which is economically far 
more efficient and which is capable of building sustainable political support.  
 
In Britain, there are serious inadequacies in social security benefit rates and the 
conditions imposed on receipt of certain benefits are unjust and inhumane, as anyone 
who has seen the film “I, Daniel Blake” will agree - though it does not follow that all 
conditionality is therefore unjust. There is also a failure to achieve full employment, 
indeed its abandonment as a political target. Tony Atkinson last year proposed that: 
“The government should adopt an explicit target for preventing and 
reducing unemployment and underpin this ambition by offering 
guaranteed public employment at the minimum wage to those who seek 
it.” (Atkinson, 2015, Proposal 3, p237).  
 
Some would go further and propose that, just as the Bank of England is lender of last 
resort, the government could become employer of last resort with a corresponding 
obligation on those seeking employment to take work, at the minimum wage, from the 
government. To make the possibility of employment a genuine one for those who do 
not have reasons of health or old age not to work, also poses challenges to other social 
policies which the government must meet for employment to be feasible: it requires 
accessible and affordable housing and adequate child care made available through 
nurseries and schools. Another neglected area is unpaid care work: many of those 
engaged in essential social care cannot seek employment yet often enjoy virtually no 
leisure and have little state support.  
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A combination of improved and extended social security and genuine full employment 
is by no means an easy option but it is essential to tackling poverty and promoting 
social justice. 
 
What is perhaps most frustrating for those who see no likelihood or desirability about 
pursuing a full CI is that it represents a diversion from the task of promoting more 
feasible and sensible reforms. There is a desperate need for more investment in human 
capital for the least advantaged and promoting more equal opportunities for all, there 
continue to be pressing issues of inheritance and social inequality and there continue 
to be employment and child care problems for those who are neither lazy nor crazy. 
Van Parijs touched on all of these but then, unfortunately, focussed on promoting CI. 
 
The simple fact is that CI is, like any component of social security, merely a 
mechanism for income redistribution – a possible means, not an end in itself. Starting 
from or believing in a mechanism is misguided. It is surely more productive to start 
from the goals of policy and then consider the best means of achieving them. If the 
goal is to reduce, or still better eliminate, poverty then the conclusion of this paper is 
that pursuing the mechanism of CI is heading in the wrong direction. 
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